Building a system for International Rugby League rankings

It seems every time the International Rugby League releases its updated International Rankings, people are mystified as to how some sides rank higher than others and more importantly, how the whole thing is even calculated.

It made me wonder if there's a mathematical system one could use to try and rank teams, so I decided to have a go at it. I will get this one statement out of the way early though - I don't think this system is good either, but one thing that is certain is that no system using a mathematical formula will work.

That's because there's been very little structure or purpose behind every match. So you will find some Emerging nations are playing nearly as many Senior International Matches as Australia, New Zealand and England. The attempts by the International Rugby League in more recent seasons to have teams playing Internationals that will affect their ranking, and determine their qualification in the upcoming World Cup is a major step in rectifying this matter.

So this bit of work is based on all International matches between two International sides (so games like Australia's PM XIII v the Papua New Guinea PM XIII are not included) and for all results over the last 10 years (2015-2024). Also, the Great Britain results are added to England, while Tonga Invitational and Tonga are combined.

There are three groups.

Group A - 10 teams - These are the 10 sides who have played in all of the last 5 World Cups:
Australia
England
Fiji
France
Ireland
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Scotland
Tonga 

Group B - 10 teams - These are the next 7 teams who have appeared in the most World Cups since 2008:
Cook Islands
Greece
Italy
Jamaica
Lebanon
USA
Wales

And, the 3 remaining teams in the International Rugby League's top 20 ranked teams not already listed:
Malta
Netherlands
Serbia

Group C - 42 teams - Literally every other nation that has played International Rugby League since 2015:
Albania
Argentina
Belgium
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burundi
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Czech Republic
Democratic Republic of Congo
Denmark
El Salvador
Germany
Ghana
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Japan
Kenya
Latvia
Montenegro
Morocco
Nigeria
Niue
North Macedonia
Norway
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Russia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Thailand
Turkiye
Ukraine
Uruguay
Vanuatu

Group D - 1 team - Estonia - Purely because they still appear on the International Rugby League rankings list despite having not played a game since 2009:
Estonia

POINTS SYSTEM
There's a lot to go through here.

World Cup
The Number of World Cups participated in from (and including) 2000-2024 is multiplied by 2.5
Extra Points are awarded for more recent World Cup appearances
2022 RLWC = 10 Points
2017 RLWC = 7 Points
2013 RLWC = 5 Points
2008 RLWC = 3 Points
2000 RLWC = 1 Point

World Cup Results
Teams will earn points based on their performance in the World Cup after the Group stages

Eliminated in First round of play-offs = 3 Points
Eliminated in Semi Finals (Final 4) = 6 Points
Runners-Up = 12 Points
World Cup Winner = 25 Points

Emerging Nations World Cup

The Number of Emerging Nations World Cups participated in from (and including) 2000-2024 is multiplied by 1.5
Extra Points are awarded for more recent Emerging Nations World Cup appearances.
2018 ENWC = 2 Points
2000 RLWC = 1 Point

Group Bonus
Bonus Points awarded based on the group a team is in:
Group A = 200 Points
Group B = 125 Points
Group C = 50 Points
Group D = 0 Points

Now we get to the tricky stuff.

Graded Performances
Teams earn points for wins, lose points for losses and these points are on a sliding scale depending on the strength of their opponent:

Group A def Group A = 3 Points
Group A def Group B = 1.5 Points
Group A def Group C = 0.5 Points

Group B def Group A = 4 Points
Group B def Group B = 2 Points
Group B def Group C = 1 Point

Group C def Group A = 5 Points
Group C def Group B = 3 Points
Group C def Group C = 1.5 Points

Group A lose to Group A = -3 Points
Group A lose to Group B = -4 Points
Group A lose to Group C = -5 Points

Group B lose to Group A = -1.5 Points
Group B lose to Group B = -2 Points
Group B lose to Group C = -3 Point

Group C lose to Group A = -0.5 Points
Group C lose to Group B = -1 Points
Group C lose to Group C = -1.5 Points

Also, a draw between two teams in the same group = 1 Point
A draw between Team A and Team B or Team B and Team C = Higher ranked side gets 0.5 points, Lower ranked side gets 1.5 points
A draw between Team A and Team C = Team A gets 0.25 points, Team C gets 2 points

Recency Bias
Points are multiplied by a higher amount for more recent seasons, to give a more reflective form rating:

2015 x1
2016 x2
2017 x3
2018 x4
2019 x5
2020 x6
2021 x7
2022 x8
2023 x9
2024 x10

Frequency of playing
Teams that play more games deserve to be rewarded, irrespective of the result, so teams will get 1 point for every match they've played in the last 10 years.

Strength of Opposition
Following on from the previous metric, teams will be awarded points based on the Group that their opponent falls in:
Number of Games v Group A = x4
Number of Games v Group B = x2
Number of Games v Group C = x1

So with all of that explained, here are the International Rugby League Rankings, mathematically speaking, as at the end of the 2024 season:

1. 775.5 - Australia
2. 700.5 - England
3. 496 - New Zealand
4. 347 - Papua New Guinea
5. 303.5 - Fiji
6. 290 - Netherlands
7. 283.5 - Ireland
8. 273 - Lebanon
9. 256 - Tonga
10. 239.5 - France
11. 233 - Samoa
12. 221.5 - Wales
13. 199.5 - Canada
14. 196.5 - Italy
15. 196 - USA
16. 191 - Serbia
17. 157 - Ukraine
18. 143.5 - Malta
19. 119 - Philippines
20. 116 - Cook Islands
21. 115 - Germany
22. 113.5 - Greece
23. 113.5 - Czech Republic
24. 108.5 - South Africa
25. 105.5 - Niue
26. 101 - Chile
27. 100 - Turkiye
28. 97 - Nigeria
29. 85.5 - Scotland
30. 85.5 - Brazil
31. 81 - Hungary
32. 81 - Japan
33. 80.5 - Belgium
34. 78.5 - Poland
35. 76 - Norway
36. 72.5 - Spain
37. 72 - Sweden
38. 70 - Russia
39. 67.5 - Thailand
40. 66.5 - Solomon Islands
41. 62.5 - Jamaica
42. 62 - Argentina
43. 59.5 - Denmark
44. 59.5 - India
45. 58 - Ghana
46. 56 - Burundi
47. 56 - Democratic Republic of Congo
48. 54 - Morocco
49. 52.5 - Peru
50. 51 - El Salvador
51. 50.5 - Latvia
52. 48.5 - Vanuatu
53. 46 - Bosnia & Herzegovina
54. 39.5 - Uruguay
55. 37 - Albania
56. 32 - Kenya
57. 32 - Montenegro
58. 26.5 - Hong Kong
59. 25 - Bulgaria
60. 19 - Cameroon
61. 18.5 - North Macedonia
62. 16.5 - Colombia
63. 0 - Estonia

The end of every year could see a modification to this system, whereby the top 10 ranked sides become Group A for the upcoming year, The next 10 become Group B etc

Have World Cups every 4 years and Emerging Nations World Cups every 4 years, but 2 years after each World Cup.

The top 20 teams in the 2 years before each World Cup will compete for the 12 spots in each World Cup.

Teams ranked 21-40 compete for the 12 spots in each Emerging Nations World Cup which means it is possible for Emerging Nations sides to qualify for the World Cup.

Obviously a hose of other purposeful tournaments could also take place, such as the Pacific Cup (but run with 2 groups and then a final between the top side in each group), a European Cup (same system as the Pacific Cup mentioned above) and possibly even an AAA Cup (America's, Asia and Africa)

If we can have a meaningful calendar where all games mean something and have the potential to make teams climb up the rankings towards a potential World Cup berth, that would make for a much more captivating International Calendar.

Stat of Origin (2019)

State of Origin gets underway in 2019 on Wednesday, June 5, in what will be the 40th year that the concept has been taking place. One-off Origin games were played in 1980 and 1981 before adopting the traditional 3 game series from 1982.

Few contests in the world have as much talk about statistics surrounding results as State of Origin though, given how close the contests typically tend to be.

We’ll hear about Queensland’s dominance in recent times, if we’re lucky, we may even be reminded of the ultimate dominance of New South Wales for 70 odd years prior to Origin and how significant that dominance was in building the oft-mentioned “Queenslander spirit and passion.”

But despite the closeness of the contest and all the talk of spirit and passion, there are some statistics that are quite overwhelming that just cannot be ignored, but have yet to be mentioned.

Until now that is.

Game I of the 2019 State of Origin series will take place at Suncorp Stadium. We’ve had 21 Game I matches played at Suncorp Stadium, with Queensland winning 11 and New South Wales 10. The last series openers played at Suncorp have been won by the Blues:
2014 – New South Wales won 12-8
2017 – New South Wales won 28-4

The Maroons last victory at home in Game I was:
2011 – Queensland won 16-12

Of the 11 times Queensland won at home in Game I, two were the first two games in 1980 and 1981, which they won. The remaining 9 saw them go on to win the series on 8 occasions. Only the 2005 series, where they won 24-20 in Game I at Suncorp, saw them lose the series.

For New South Wales, 10 of their wins at Suncorp in Game I has contributed to them winning 7 series.

Winning at Suncorp in Game I is clearly a huge contributor to series success for both sides. This is quite a telling stat. But it’s not the only one.

On 80 of the 103 occasions where a team has lead an Origin game at half-time, they have gone on to win the match. That’s a 77.67% chance of winning the game after leading at the break. Queensland has lead at half time on 49 occasions and won 41 times or 83.67% of the time. New South Wales has lead 54 times and went on to win 39 of those games, at 72.22%.

Teams leading at halftime at Suncorp have gone on to win the match on 82.35% of the time and to drill down even further, teams leading at halftime at Suncorp in Game 1 have won 18 of 21 matches, or 85.71%.

These stats combine to tell us that the opening 40 minutes of the opening State of Origin game this year could very well determine who will not only win the game, but also the series.

Data courtesy of my website Rugby League Project
Please donate to help me run the website at Patreon

Where Does The Melbourne Storm Dynasty Rank? (2017)

The Melbourne Storm’s emphatic 34-6 victory over the determined North Queensland Cowboys in the 2017 NRL grand final brought an end to the tenure of one of the greatest playmaking trios at club level, with Cooper Cronk leaving the club and long-term teammates Billy Slater and Cameron Smith.

So how does this Melbourne Storm dynasty compare to those of the past?

As far as longevity is concerned, the current Storm side began their dynasty in 2003 – when Craig Bellamy took over as coach, and Slater and Smith embarked on their rookie campaigns – making this their 15th season. Only two others have lasted longer: Brisbane’s 18 years from 1992-2009 and the phenomenal St George run of 23 straight seasons in finals football from 1951-1973.

No side comes close to the Dragons’ dynasty for most premierships won, as they collected 11 consecutive titles from 1956-66. The Souths side of 1923-35 scored seven titles, Balmain’s 1914-24 outfit bagged six premierships, as did the Broncos.

Melbourne rank much further down the dynasty list if you count their two titles stripped (2007 and ’09) for salary cap breaches, and rank equal second-last if you only consider the official titles won – their 2012 and ’17 premierships.

That St George side also appeared in the most deciders, with 14 grand final appearances in their 23-year run. The Souths side mentioned above played in 10 premiership finals, while the Roosters of 1930-42 played in nine. These are the only sides to played more deciders than this Storm outfit, who have been in seven, equal with three other dynasties.

The Dragons also claimed 12 minor premierships. The Storm are second, tied with the Balmain 1914-24 dynasty with six. The Storm have also only missed the finals once in the past 15 seasons – in 2010, when the NRL ruled the club would not be awarded competition points.

Then comes arguably the most important factor, win percentage. There have been 19 dynasties since 1908 to have had a run of at least nine seasons, winning at least one premiership and were victorious in at least 60 percent of all games played (regular season, play-offs and finals). These sides have won 75 of the 111 titles won since 1908.

Souths (1923-35) – 74.02%
St.George (1951-73) – 72.39%
Souths (1908-18) – 71.52%
Balmain (1914-24) – 70.07%
Souths (1949-57) – 69.78%
Melbourne (2003-17) – 68.10%
Easts (1930-42) – 68.02%
Manly (1966-78) – 67.63%
Manly (1990-98) – 67.13%
Souths (1965-74) – 66.67%
Parramatta (1975-86) – 66.24%
Canberra (1987-98) – 65.65%
Sydney City (1996-2004) – 63.90%
Balmain (1939-50) – 63.64%
Brisbane (1992-2009) – 63.56%
Easts (1972-83) – 63.27%
Manly (1980-88) – 62.56%
Manly (2005-14) – 61.98%
Newcastle (1995-2003) – 61.47%

During the salary cap era, this Melbourne side has clearly been the most dominant dynasty, playing in more grand finals, winning the second-most number of grand finals, claiming the most minor premierships, having the highest win percentage in finals football, and in total.

The figures show that this Storm side is the best dynasty the game has seen since the legendary St George Dragons’ incomparable era. And while many will argue otherwise – mostly those still holding strong indignation against the club for its salary cap rorting almost a decade ago – the figures don’t lie.

 
We have just been witness to the closest thing to (albeit it was a long way away from) the Dragons’ dynasty of the 1950s, ’60s and early ’70s. Perhaps it’s time to sit back and realise that it took half a century for any team to get close to that side and give the Melbourne Storm the respect and gratitude for their achievements the club deserves.

****This article appeared on Commentary Box Sports website on October 3, 2017****

Clueless Tigers Repeating Same Old Mistakes (2017)

On Monday the Wests Tigers board decided to sack their head coach Jason Taylor. It’s a decision the club has made twice before in less than five years when it terminated Tim Sheens’ lucrative contract in the 2012 offseason and then foolishly removed Michael Potter at the end of 2014, just as he was making progress.

The fact is the people appointing the coaches have got it wrong twice now and it has had a big impact on the development of the improperly labelled ‘Big 4’ of James Tedesco, Aaron Woods, Mitchell Moses and Luke Brooks. If anything they should be labelled ‘the Big 2 and 2 passengers.’

The Tigers have admitted their salary cap has been a mess for a number of years and have done very little to amend that. They provided zero support for Michael Potter and gave him little control of the roster. Despite this, Potter was slowly making headway before the club panicked over a silly story aired by Gorden Tallis about an off-the-record comment Farah had made 18 months earlier. The club didn’t try any mediation between captain and coach. They let the story drag on and entirely derail their campaign.

The club then opted to remove Potter, which was seen as the board’s backing of Farah – despite both parties saying there was no issue between them.

Two years later the joint venture turned its back on Farah and allowed his legacy and reputation at the club to be dragged through the slime and be completely destroyed, opting to side with coach Jason Taylor.

Now they’ve knifed Taylor. It’s a hasty decision made with no apparent replacement in sight. It’s a decision made under the guise of perceived business acumen, to fix the club. What it is though is yet another clueless decision by a clueless board that have proven, on multiple occasions and across multiple facets of running a sporting team, to be clueless.

While Taylor needed to go, the issue is that he should never have been hired. Who hires an unproven NRL coach to take over a team of relative rookies in a rebuilding phase?

The Tigers’ recruitment and retention team has long been a laughing stock of the competition. It seems they are hellbent on trying to recreate the sort of team that won the 2005 premiership, without realising that the game has changed so much since then, to the point that small teams have zero advantage.

The club under Taylor has continually gotten worse. In 2017 they have zero depth at all to work with, made no worthwhile purchases in the off season, and yet are still at the cap ceiling. They’re paying over a $1 million to people no longer at the joint.

The last two weeks has seen the NRL side lose 36-2 against a Penrith side who were flogged in their previous match and then 46-6 against a Canberra side who were also flogged in their previous match.

The Holden Cup side lost 36-4 to Penrith and 54-10 to Canberra, while the Intrust Super Premiership side lost 52-12 to Penrith and 36-0 against the Warriors.

That’s a total of six losses in six games, scoring 34 points and conceding 260, an average scoreline of 43-5 across all three grades.

NRL

INTRUST SUPER PREMIERSHIP

NYC

This shows that while Jason Taylor was part of the problem, he wasn’t the whole problem.

Marina Go, the Wests Tigers chairperson, stated in yesterday’s press conference, “from the board down we all take responsibility for where we sit today.”

Yet what transpired was the board taking very little responsibility, throwing the easy target under the bus while addressing none of the issues that they are entirely responsible for.

How is the club at its cap ceiling?

Why is there zero depth at the club?

Why are all three sides being flogged?

Why did the club agree to have its ‘Big 2 and 2 passengers’ all come off contract at the same time?
Why did no one know about Tim Simona’s off-field antics?

The board hired Taylor and proceeded to sack him. That shows the board is simply not good enough to be running a football club. If the Wests Tigers are going to enact genuine change, then the decision-makers above the coach all have to go as well. You cannot change culture by removing one person. The decisions to sack/not retain Sheens, Potter, Benji Marshall and Farah have all proven that.

At what point does the club stop ridding itself of coaches and players to try fix their many issues, and instead start to look inward and realise that the issue lies in the front office and the boardroom?

****This article appeared on Commentary Box Sports website on  March 21, 2017****